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ARTICLES
THE FEDERAL RESERVE'S PROPOSED
INTERPRETATION REGARDING THE
ANTI-TYING RESTRICTIONS OF SECTION 106 OF
THE BANK HOLDING COMPANY ACT
AMENDMENTS OF 1970
RICHARD K. KIM'
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 25, 2003, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (Federal Reserve) issued a proposed
interpretation (Proposal) 2 of the anti-tying restrictions of section
106 of the Bank Holding Company Act amendments of 1970
(section 106).' The proposal marks the first comprehensive
guidance issued by the Federal Reserve regarding section 106 since
its enactment over thirty years ago. In addition, the Federal
Reserve issued supervisory guidance specifying the appropriate
internal controls that banking organizations should have in place
to ensure compliance with section 106.'
In general terms, section 106 prohibits banks from
conditioning the availability of a product, such as a loan or its
pricing, on the requirement that the customer obtain some
additional product or service from the bank or its affiliates.5 For
example, under section 106, it would be impermissible for a
commercial bank to offer a loan product, or a discounted rate on a
loan product, to a company on the condition that the company
1. Mr. Kim is a partner with the law firm of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz.
2. Proposed Interpretation, Anti-tying Restrictions of Section 106 of the Bank
Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,024, 52,024 (Aug. 29,
2003).
3. 12 U.S.C. § 1972 (2001).
4. 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,024.
5. See 12 U.S.C. § 1972.
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engage the commercial bank's investment banking affiliate to
provide mergers acquisitions advice or securities underwriting.
Although relatively simple in its terms, section 106 can be difficult
to apply as the permissibility of a transaction or series of
transactions will often depend on a number of factors, including
the parties' understandings and prior course of conduct. In
addition, as the Federal Reserve noted in the Proposal, "the
actions, statements and policies of the bank involved in the
particular transaction often play an important role in determining
whether the bank has violated section 106.",6 The Federal Reserve
is the regulator charged with the responsibility of enforcing the
tying rules and examining bank holding companies for compliance
with them.
As discussed below, section 106 is subject to a number of
exceptions. For example, section 106 does not bar a nonbank
affiliate of the bank from conditioning the availability of a product,
or varying its terms, on the condition that the customer purchase a
product from it or one of its affiliates.7  Hence, a nonbank
subsidiary could offer to make a loan to a customer contingent on
the customer obtaining investment banking products or services
from the subsidiary or one of its affiliates. In addition, section 106
exempts from its prohibitions certain traditional banking products
- i.e., a "loan, discount, deposit, or trust service."8
Section 106 was adopted by Congress in 1970 as part of a
broader set of amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act
that significantly expanded the ability of bank holding companies
to engage in nonbanking activities.9 The underlying legislative
intent of section 106 was to ensure that, as banking organizations
entered new lines of business, they would not have an unfair
competitive advantage by virtue of their banking powers over
other types of financial services organizations.1" As the Federal
Reserve cited, in enacting section 106, "Congress expressed
6. 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,024.
7. See 12 U.S.C. § 1972(1).
8. 12 U.S.C. § 1972(1)(A).
9. See Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, §
106, 84 Stat. 1766-68 (1970) (current version at 12 U.S.C. 1971-78 (2001)).
10. See id.; 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,024.
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concern that banks might use their ability to offer bank products
- credit in particular - in a coercive manner to give a
competitive advantage in markets for nonbanking products and
services (such as insurance sales).""
Over the past year, the Federal Reserve's enforcement of
section 106 has received heightened attention as a result of
numerous newspaper accounts of allegedly widespread "pay to
play" tactics by commercial banks. In addition, Congressman John
Dingell has written several letters to the Federal Reserve and the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) urging them to
increase their enforcement efforts in this area. 2 As a result, the
Federal Reserve and the OCC conducted a targeted review of
several large bank holding companies in order to assess their level
of compliance with the tying rules. 3 While this review did not
yield any public enforcement actions from either regulator, it is a
given that banks have become increasingly aggressive in cross-
marketing financial services and products to their customers,
particularly in the investment banking arena. 4 This market
development has generally been attributed to the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act, which removed the remaining regulatory barriers to
commercial banks entering the investment banking business."
11. 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,024.
12. See Letter from Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, and John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of the Currency,
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, to the Honorable John D. Dingell,
Ranking Member of the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the U.S. House of
Representatives, (Aug. 13, 2002), available at http://www.house.gov/
commercedemocrats/press/081302frboccrsp.pdf) (hereinafter "Dingell Letter"); see
also Letter from John D. Dingell, Ranking Member of the Committee on Energy and
Commerce, to the Honorable Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, the Honorable John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller, Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Honorable David M. Walker,
Comptroller General, U.S. General Accounting Office, (Sept. 12, 2002), available at
http://www.house.gov/commerce-democrats/press/1071tr187.htm.
13. Id. at 2; General Accounting Office, Bank Tying: Additional Steps Needed to
Ensure Effective Enforcement of Tying Prohibitions, GAO-04-3, (Oct. 2003),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d043.pdf; Gerferal Accounting Office,
Bank Oversight: Few Cases of Tying Have Been Detected, GAO/GGD-97-58, 3 (May
8, 1997), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/gg97058.pdf.
14. See generally Dingell Letter, supra note 12, at 4-5 (discussing the growth of
investment banking activities).
15. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(E) (2001).
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Another less cited reason is the large-scale consolidation
that has occurred over the past several years among the biggest
banks. The Citicorp/Travelers, Bank of America/NationsBank,
and J.P. Morgan/Chase mergers, among others, have created huge
banks with balance sheets many times larger than stand-alone
investment banks. These banks have come to realize that their
capacity to make and hold loans is a powerful competitive weapon
which permits them to offer "one stop shopping" for corporate
transactions to a degree that investment banks cannot. The
creation of these enormous banks coincided with the near-
withdrawal of Japanese banks from the U.S. commercial lending
markets, which placed more of a premium on the ability of banks
to provide credit.
The Proposal covers a wide range of open questions
regarding section 106, including three areas in which detailed
guidance from the Federal Reserve has been long awaited:
(i) the scope of the traditional bank product
exceptions;
(ii) the permissibility of so-called "mixed product
arrangements," which involve both traditional bank
products that are exempt from section 106 and other
products, which are not exempt; and
(iii) the permissibility of voluntary tying
arrangements, which are sought or, in some cases
demanded, by a customer. 16
II. STATUTORY OVERVIEW
Section 106 prohibits banks from extending credit, leasing
or selling any property or furnishing any service, or fixing or
varying the consideration for any of the foregoing, on the
condition or requirement that the customer do any of the
following:
16. 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,025.
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1. "[O]btain some additional credit, property, or service from
[the] bank other than a loan, discount, deposit or trust
service;" 17
2. "[P]rovide some additional credit, property, or service to
[the] bank, other than those related to and usually provided
in connection with a loan, discount, deposit, or trust
service;""
3. Obtain from or provide to an affiliate of the bank "some
additional credit, property or service;" 9 or
4. "[N]ot obtain some other credit, property or service from a
competitor of [the] bank," or of an affiliate of the bank,
unless the condition is "reasonably impose[d] in a credit
transaction to assure the soundness of the credit., 20
Importantly, section 106 applies only to tying arrangements
that are imposed by a bank, which is defined in section 106 to
include virtually all institutions chartered as banks, including
"insured banks" defined by section 3 of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act.2' Included in section 106's scope are limited
purpose credit card banks, industrial loan corporations, limited-
purpose trust companies, and Edge Act and Agreement
corporations.22 Note that U.S. branches, agencies, and commercial
lending companies of foreign banks are subject to section 106
largely to the same extent as U.S. banks.23 Section 106 does not
apply to transactions conducted by a non-U.S. branch of a foreign
17. 12 U.S.C. § 1792(1)(A) (emphasis added).
18. Id. § 1792(1)(C) (emphasis added).
19. Id. §1792(1)(B), (D).
20. Id. §1792(1)(E) (emphasis added).
21. 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,033; see 12 U.S.C. § 1813 (2001).
22. 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,033, n.64.
23. Id. The terms "branch," "agency," and "commercial lending company of a
foreign bank" are defined in section 8 of the International Banking Act. 12 U.S.C.
§ 3106 (2001).
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bank.24 Anti-tying restrictions, almost identical to those imposed
on banks under section 106, also apply to savings associations
pursuant to the Home Owners' Loan Act.
The statute does not apply to tying arrangements imposed
by a nonbank affiliate of a bank. 6 Thus, for example, section 106
bars a bank from making a bridge loan to a company on the
condition that the company retains the bank's affiliated investment
bank to underwrite any future securities offering by the company
to repay the loan.27 However, section 106 does not bar a nonbank
affiliate of the bank from making a bridge loan with these
conditions. In addition, section 106 does not bar the bank from
offering the bridge loan on the condition that the company obtains
a longer term loan from the bank to repay the bridge loan. For
purposes of section 106, an affiliate of a bank is a "a bank holding
company of such bank, [or] ... any other subsidiary of such bank
holding company., 28 All companies which control a bank subject
to section 106 receive bank holding company treatment.29 This is
true regardless of whether the company is registered as a bank
holding company under the Bank Holding Company Act.30 All
natural persons that control a bank subject to section 106 are
treated as "bank holding companies."'" Any company that person
controls will be treated as a bank affiliate or bank holding
company subsidiary for section 106 purposes.32
24. See 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,033.
25. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(q) (2001 & Supp. 2003); 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,027.
26. 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,024.
27. See id. at 52,033.
28. 12 U.S.C. § 1972(1)(B),(D). The exclusive dealing prohibition in Section
106(1)(E) similarly prohibits a bank from requiring that a customer not obtain an
additional product from a competitor of the "bank holding company of such bank, or
any subsidiary of such bank holding company." Id. at § 1972(1)(E).
29. 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,033. see 12 U.S.C. § 1843(f)(9), (h)(1) (2001).
A company that controls a bank (as defined under section 2(c) of
the Bank Holding Company Act) and that is not considered a bank
holding company by reason of section 2(a)(5) of the BHC Act,
however, is not considered a bank holding company for purposes
of section 106 and, thus, is not considered an affiliate of the bank
for purposes of this statement.
68 Fed. Reg. at 52,033 n. 71.
30. 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,033.
31. Id. at 52,033.
32. Id. See 12 U.S.C. § 1971.
TYING RESTRICTIONS
III. NECESSARY ELEMENTS TO A SECTION 106 VIOLATION
Under the Proposal, two essential elements characterize a
tying arrangement by a bank that violates section 106:
(1) The arrangement must involve two or more
separate products: the customer's desired product(s)
and one or more separate tied products; and
(2) The bank must force the customer to obtain (or
provide) the tied product(s) from (or to) the bank
or an affiliate in order to obtain the customer's
desired product(s) from the bank.33
Accordingly, a tying arrangement, established by section
106, must involve at least two distinct products.34 The Proposal
notes that two products are generally "separate and distinct"
under section 106 "only if there is sufficient consumer demand for
each of the products individually that it would be efficient for a
firm to provide the two products separately."35 Hence, a bank may
require that a borrower provide certain collateral to receive a loan
or a more favorable interest rate on a loan.36 Because the bank is
only providing one product to the customer, section 106 does not
apply.37
Moreover, section 106 applies exclusively to situations
where a bank conditions the provision of a particular product, or
discount on such product, (desired product) on the purchase, or
provision to the bank, of another product (tied product) by the
customer.38 In the Proposal, the Federal Reserve interprets this
element literally, concluding that "section 106 applies only if each
of two requirements are met: (1) A condition or requirement exists
that ties the customer's desired product to another product; and
33. 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,027.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 50,027 n.23.
36. Id. at 50,027.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 52,028.
2004]
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
(2) this condition or requirement was imposed or forced on the
customer by the bank."39 While it has been generally understood
that a violation of section 106 must contain a condition or re-
quirement that the customer obtain or provide an additional
product or service, the Federal Reserve has not previously
determined in any published interpretation that there must also be
an element of coercion in order for a violation of section 106 to
occur. Indeed, at least one court has determined that section 106
prohibits a "voluntary tie," i.e., a tying of products that the
customer agrees to voluntarily.4" As the Federal Reserve noted in
the Proposal:
In this regard, section 106 was intended to prohibit
banks from using their ability to offer bank
products, and credit in particular, as leverage to
force a customer to purchase (or provide) another
product from (or to) the bank or an affiliate. It was
not the purpose of the statute to prohibit bank
customers from using their own bargaining power to
obtain a package of desired products from a bank
and its affiliates or a price discount on those
products. Similarly, it was not the purpose of the
statute to prohibit customers from voluntarily
seeking and obtaining multiple products that the
customer desires from a bank or its affiliates.4
It bears noting that, under the Proposal, coercive actions
may be "explicit or implicit" and can be in the form of either oral
or written communications. 2 The Federal Reserve's coercion
requirement thus does not provide substantial protection to banks
from avoiding tying violations. Moreover, it adds considerable
complexity to an inquiry as to whether a tying violation has
39. Id.
40. Dibidale of Louisiana, Inc. v. American Bank & Trust Company, 916 F.2d
300 (5th Cir. 1990).
41. 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,029 (emphasis added).
42. Id.
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occurred.43 The Proposal notes that the terms of the bank's offer
to the customer is the best evidence as to whether a tying violation
has occurred:
Other information that may be useful in
determining whether a condition or requirement
exists and, if so, whether the bank coerced the
customer into accepting the condition or
requirement include any correspondence and
conversations between the bank and the customer
concerning the transaction; the marketing or other
materials presented to the customer by the bank or
an affiliate; the bank's course of dealings with the
customer and other similarly situated customers; the
banking organization's policies and procedures; the
customer's course of dealings with the bank and
other financial institutions; the financial resources
and level of sophistication of the customer; and
whether the customer was represented by legal
counsel or other advisors.'
Needless to say, a factual investigation of this scope, particularly
one that involves both oral and written communications, will often
be a nearly impossible burden.
IV. EXCEPTIONS
A. Traditional Bank Products Exception
Section 106 contains an express exception for transactions
by banks where the products are limited to the enumerated
traditional banking products of "loan[s], discount[s], deposit[s], or
trust service[s]."45 The Federal Reserve's Regulation Y extended
the traditional bank product exception to transactions where the
product being tied is a traditional bank product offered by an
43. See id. at 52,029.
44. Id. at 52,029.
45. 12 U.S.C. 1972(1)(A); 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,026, 52,030.
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affiliate of the bank.46 Under this exception, if a customer requests
a specific product, whether or not it is a traditional bank product,
the bank or affiliate can require that the customer also purchase a
traditional bank product in order to obtain the requested
product.47 Historically, the Federal Reserve has interpreted the
scope of the traditional bank products exception conservatively
and has not issued interpretations significantly expanding their
scope beyond the four products expressly listed in section 106.
However, in the Proposal the Federal Reserve lists the following
products as being among those that are traditional bank products:
" All types of extensions of credit, including loans, lines
of credit, and backup lines of credit;48
" Letters of credit and financial guarantees;
* Lease transactions that are the functional equivalent of
an extension of credit;
" Credit derivatives where the bank or affiliate is the
seller of credit protection;
" Acquiring, brokering, arranging, syndicating and
servicing loans or other extensions of credit;
* All forms of deposit accounts, including demand,
negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW), savings and
time deposit accounts;
* Safe deposit box services;
" Escrow services;
46. Regulation Y, 12 C.F.R. § 225.7(b) (2003).
47. 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,030.
48. Notably, the Proposal states that an "'extension of credit' for this purpose
does not include underwriting, privately placing or brokering debt securities." Id. at
52,030 n.43.
[Vol. 8
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" Payment and settlement services, including check
clearing, check guaranty, ACH, wire transfer, and debit
card services;
* Payroll services;
* Traveler's check and money order services;
" Cash management services;49
" Services provided, as trustee or guardian, or as executor
or administrator of an estate;
• Discretionary asset management services provided as
fiduciary;5"
* Custody services (including securities lending services);
and
* Paying agent, transfer agent and registrar services.5
The traditional bank products exception is particularly
relevant when evaluating the permissibility of mixed-product
arrangements. In assessing these arrangements, the Federal
Reserve posits a "meaningful option" test in the Proposal.52
Under this test, if a bank responds to a customer's request for a
loan by informing the customer that it must purchase other
products in order to be eligible for the loan and offers the
49. The Proposal defines "cash management services" to be "the payment and
collection services that are provided to customers to speed collection of receivables,
control payments and efficiently manage deposit balances." Id. at 52,030 n.45. It
further states, "[c]ash management services may include one or more of the
traditional bank products listed separately above, such as deposit, payment and
lockbox services." Id.
50. The Proposal states that a "bank has discretionary authority over an account
for these purposes if the bank, acting in a fiduciary capacity, has sole or shared
authority (whether or not that authority is exercised) to determine what assets to
purchase or sell on behalf of the account." Id. at 52,030 n.46.
51. 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,030.
52. Id. at 52,031.
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customer an assortment of products from which to select, the
customer must have a "meaningful option to satisfy the bank's
condition solely through the purchase of the traditional bank
products."53 If the customer is not presented with "a meaningful
option to satisfy the bank's condition solely through the purchase
of the traditional bank products," the arrangement would not be
consistent with section 106 because the customer would effectively
be required to purchase a non-traditional bank product in order to
acquire the requested product.54
B. Other exceptions
Section 106 also contains exceptions from its limitations on
reciprocity and exclusive dealing. The availability of these
exceptions is largely unaffected by the Proposal. "The reciprocity
restrictions of section 106 generally prohibit a bank from condi-
tioning the availability or price of a product (the desired product)
on a requirement that the customer provide another product (the
tied product) to the bank or an affiliate," except where the product
to be provided by the customer is "'related to and usually provided
in connection with a loan, discount, deposit, or trust service' (a
'usually connected product'). 56  Regulation Y extends this
exception to include circumstances where a bank requires its
customer to provide a bank affiliate with a "usually connected
product."5 " The exclusive dealing restrictions bar banks from
conditioning the receipt of particular bank products or prices on a
customer's pledge not to obtain products from a competitor bank
or its affiliates.58 However, an exception to this rule applies to
reasonable conditions mandated by a bank which "ensure the
soundness of credit."59 Regulation Y also contains several "safe
53. Id. (emphasis added).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 52,031-32.
56. Id. at 52,031 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1972(1)(C)).
57. Id. at 52,031; 12 C.F.R. § 225.7(b)(1)(ii).
58. 12 U.S.C. § 1972(1)(E); 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,032.
59. 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,032.
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harbors" from section 106's prohibitions, including those related to
combined-balance discount packages and foreign transactions.6"
V. APPROPRIATE INTERNAL CONTROLS
The Proposal reflects a flexible approach to evaluating the
adequacy of internal controls aimed at ensuring compliance with
section 106.61 It notes that the "types of anti-tying policies,
procedures and systems appropriate for a particular bank depends
on the size of the bank, and the nature, scope and complexity of
the bank's activities (including activities conducted in conjunction
with affiliates)., 62 Section 106's limitations should be reflected in a
banking organization's "policies and procedures, including the
institution's corporate policies and procedures concerning credit
approval, new product approval and pricing, and marketing." 63 As
with almost all compliance programs, employee training and
education as to the limitations of section 106 is paramount.'
The Proposal advocates that banks evaluate which
personnel positions pose the greatest risk with respect to section
106 and ensure that they receive the most comprehensive
65training. Some of the positions cited in the Proposal are
"corporate relationship managers, syndicated lending personnel,
persons with authority to approve credit extensions or establish
pricing policies for the bank and other personnel that have direct
contact with customers for purposes of marketing or selling the
bank's products., 66 Interestingly, the Proposal recommends that
banks "review their employee compensation programs in order to
ensure that such programs do not provide employees
60. 12 C.F.R. § 225.7(b)(2), (3); 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,032-33. Allowable combined-
balance discounts include a bank's ability "to offer certain combined-balance
discount programs to individuals without making a specific determination that the
particular customer has a meaningful option of qualifying for the discounts within the
program solely through the use of the deposit products (a traditional bank product)
included in the program." 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,035 n.76.
61. See id. at 52,033-35.
62. Id. at 52,034.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,034.
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inappropriate incentives to tie products in a manner prohibited by
section 106. ' ' 67 The Proposal also recommends that banking
organizations have in place policies and procedures that:
* Provide personnel with questions concerning section
106 access to knowledgeable legal or compliance
professionals;68
" Apply standardized procedures to the processing of
customer complaints which allege that the bank has
violated section 106; and 69
" Prohibit adverse actions against a customer by the
banking organization or its employees upon the filing of
a section 106 complaint with the bank or a regulator by
the customer.7 °
The Federal Reserve also states in the Proposal that mixed-
product arrangements require special policies and procedures
given the complexity that can be involved in establishing whether a
violation of section 106 has occurred.7' For these types of
transactions, a bank's policies, procedures and documentation
should consider:
The factors and types of information that the bank will
review in forming a good faith belief that any customer
offered a mixed-product arrangement has a meaningful
option to satisfy the bank's condition solely through the
purchase of one or more of the traditional bank
products included in the arrangement. Information
relevant to this determination may include:
67. Id. at 52,034 n.73.
68. Id. at 52,034.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 52,034-35.
[Vol. 8
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" The range and types of traditional bank products that
are offered by the bank and its affiliates and included in
the mixed-product arrangement;
" The manner in which traditional bank products and
non-traditional products are treated for purposes of
determining whether a customer has or would meet the
condition associated with the arrangement;
" The types and amounts of traditional bank products
typically required or obtained by companies that are
comparable in size, credit quality, and nature, scope and
complexity of business operations to the customer;
" Information provided by the customer concerning the
types and amounts of traditional bank products needed
or desired by the customer and the customer's ability to
obtain those products from the bank or its affiliates;
" The bank personnel authorized to make the analysis
described above for individual customers or classes of
customers and the training and guidelines provided
these personnel; and
* The internal processes and controls, including approval
and documentation requirements, the bank uses to
ensure that the analysis described above is
(i) performed by the bank for a customer before the
customer is offered a mixed-product arrangement and
(ii) adequately reflected in the records of the bank.72
The Proposal states that, in the case of "mixed-product
arrangements, banks may not weight, discourage the use of, or
otherwise treat traditional bank products in a manner that is
designed to deprive customers of a meaningful choice."73
72. 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,034-35 (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 52,034 n.75.
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The Proposal warns that the permissibility of a mixed-
product arrangement is particularly difficult to justify where these
arrangements are offered to individuals. 4 Reasons for this include
that individuals typically have less bargaining power than
companies and are often less financially sophisticated. Hence,
banking organizations should generally refrain from offering these
arrangements to individuals unless they are in compliance with
another exception or the combined-balance discount referenced
above.76
VI. ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS TO DATE
Two days after the release of the Proposal, the Federal
Reserve announced the issuance of a formal enforcement action
against WestLB AG and its New York branch.77 The order cited
violations of section 106 and related unsafe and unsound banking
practices and imposed a civil money penalty in the amount of $3
-million.78 The enforcement order against WestLB marked the first
time that the Federal Reserve had announced a formal
enforcement action against a banking organization primarily
focused on violations of section 106. The enforcement action
appears to have resulted from complaints regarding WestLB's
compliance with section 106 that were forwarded to the Federal
Reserve by Congressman John Dingell in September 2002.79
74. Id. at 52,035.
75. Id.
76. Id.; see supra note 60 and accompanying text (discussion of combined-balance
discounts).
77. Federal Reserve Board of Governors, In the Matter of WestLB AG
Dusseldorf, Germany; WestLB AG New York Branch, Order for Cease and Desist
and Order of Assessment of Civil Money Penalties Issued Upon Consent, Docket
No. 03-030-B-FB/03-030-CMP-FB (Aug. 27, 2003), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/enforcement/2003/20030827/
attachment.pdf.
78. Id.
79. Letter from Congressman John D. Dingell, Ranking Member of the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce, to the Honorable Alan Greenspan, Chairman,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Honorable John D. Hawke,
Jr., Comptroller of the Currency, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the
Honorable David M. Walker, Comptroller General, U.S. General Accounting Office
(Sept. 12, 2002), available at http://www.house.gov/commerce-democrats/press/
1071tr187.htm.
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Previously, the Federal Reserve had conducted special
targeted reviews of compliance with the tying rules, as recently as
2002 in response to numerous newspaper accounts of widespread
"pay to play" tactics by commercial banks and in the early 1990s in
response to a letter from Morgan Stanley & Co. complaining of
widespread tying practices. While evidence of isolated violations
may have been found, no public enforcement actions were
announced as a result of these reviews.
VII. CONCLUSION
In its Proposal, the Federal Reserve has provided much
needed guidance with respect to the scope and application of
section 106. Over the past several years, many regulatory barriers
have either been eroded by regulatory interpretations or done
away with altogether by legislation, such as the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act. As a result of these developments, the remaining
regulatory limitations, such as Section 106 as well as section 23A of
the Federal Reserve Act regulating affiliate transactions,"° have
come to be perceived by many as key protections. Accordingly, it
has become increasingly incumbent upon the Federal Reserve to
define the boundaries of these protections. It is not by coincidence
that the Proposal, the first comprehensive guidance issued by the
Federal Reserve relating to section 106, was preceded by the
adoption by the Federal Reserve of Regulation W8 in 2002, the
first comprehensive guidance to section 23A, which was enacted in
1933.
While the Proposal is a significant step forward in applying
a statute that is over thirty years old to today's financial services
industry, more work needs to be done by the Federal Reserve to
ensure that the Proposal is not overly burdensome on the banking
industry to follow and the Federal Reserve to enforce. As noted
above, the Proposal states that some of the considerations that
may be relevant in determining whether a tying violation has
occurred include:
80. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1972, 371c (2001).
81. 12 C.F.R. Pt. 223 (2003).
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• any correspondence and conversations between the
bank and the customer concerning the transaction;
• [any] marketing materials presented to the customer by
the bank or an affiliate;
• the bank's course of dealings with the customer and
other similarly situated customers;
• the banking organization's policies and procedures;
* the customer's course of dealings with the bank and
other financial institutions; [and]
* the financial.., sophistication of the customer.82
It would be highly difficult for banking organizations to take these
factors into account in ensuring that each transaction that it enters,
which involves more than one product, complies with section 106.
Just as importantly, it would be virtually impossible for the Federal
Reserve to monitor whether a section 106 violation has occurred.
At best, bank examiners would be able to analyze a handful of
transactions during the course of an examination and, even then,
would have great difficulty in assessing some of these factors, such
as conversations between the bank and the customer and the
customer's course of dealing with the bank and other financial
institutions. Such a fact-intensive approach runs the risk of
eventually collapsing under its own weight.
Nevertheless, despite these difficulties, the Proposal is
welcome guidance in a relatively undefined area of law. Banking
organizations are well advised to carefully evaluate the state of
their internal controls with respect to section 106. With the
continuing insistence of Congressman John D. Dingell for the
Federal Reserve to investigate potential tying abuses and enforce
anti-tying regulations as well as the Federal Reserve's recent
82. 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,029.
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action against WestLB AG, it is clear that banking organizations
who are found to have violated section 106 will be dealt with
harshly by the Federal Reserve and the OCC.83
83. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
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